

Context: Elliptic curves

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
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
- ▶ Additive group law: $E(\mathbb{F}_q)$ is an abelian group
 - addition via the “chord and tangent” method
 - \mathcal{O} is the neutral element

[See D. Robert's lectures]


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
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Scalar multiplication and discrete logarithm

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 - let \mathbb{G} be a cyclic subgroup of $E(\mathbb{F}_q)$
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$$\begin{aligned} \exp_P : \mathbb{Z}/\ell\mathbb{Z} &\longrightarrow \mathbb{G} \\ k &\longmapsto kP = \underbrace{P + P + \dots + P}_{k \text{ times}} \end{aligned}$$

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► The inverse map is the so-called discrete logarithm (in base P):

$$\begin{aligned} \text{dlog}_P = \exp_P^{-1} : \mathbb{G} &\longrightarrow \mathbb{Z}/\ell\mathbb{Z} \\ Q &\longmapsto k \quad \text{such that } Q = kP \end{aligned}$$


Towards elliptic curve cryptography

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
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


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


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


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


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


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
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
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


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
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


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
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


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- ▶ That's a **one-way function** \Rightarrow **Public-key** cryptography!
 - **private** key: an integer k in $\mathbb{Z}/\ell\mathbb{Z}$
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
Example 1: EC Diffie–Hellman key exchange

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
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

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

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

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
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
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




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
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


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


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


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
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
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
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- ▶ etc.
- ▶ Other important operations might be required, such as pairings
[See J. Krämer's talk]

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 - **branch-prediction** attacks?
 - **power** or **electromagnetic** analysis?
 - etc.⇒ Possible attack scenarios **depend on the application**

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- ⇒ In such cases, implementation security is usually less critical

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
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
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 - **PAVOIS project** (announced) [See A. Tisserand's talk]


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


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


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Outline

- I. Scalar multiplication
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- IV. Software considerations
- V. Notions of hardware design

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Scalar multiplication

► Given k in $\mathbb{Z}/\ell\mathbb{Z}$ and P in $\mathbb{G} \subseteq E(\mathbb{F}_q)$, we want to compute

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- ▶ Size of ℓ (and k) for crypto applications: between 250 and 500 bits
- ▶ Repeated addition, in $O(k)$ complexity, is out of the question!

Double-and-add algorithm

- ▶ Available operations on $E(\mathbb{F}_q)$:
 - point addition: $(Q, R) \mapsto Q + R$
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 - same principle as binary exponentiation

Double-and-add algorithm

- ▶ Denoting by $(k_{n-1} \dots k_1 k_0)_2$, with $n = \lceil \log_2 \ell \rceil$, the binary expansion of k :

function scalar-mult(k, P):

$T \leftarrow \mathcal{O}$

for $i \leftarrow n - 1$ **downto** 0:

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- ▶ Example: $k = 431$

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$$T = P = P$$

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$$T = P \cdot 2 = 2P$$

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- ▶ Example: $k = 431 = (1\underline{1}0101111)_2$

$$T = P \cdot 2 + P = 3P$$

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- ▶ Example: $k = 431 = (110\underline{1}01111)_2$

$$T = (P \cdot 2 + P) \cdot 2 = 6P$$

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$$T = (P \cdot 2 + P) \cdot 2^2 = 12P$$

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$$T = (P \cdot 2 + P) \cdot 2^2 + P = 13P$$

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- ▶ Example: $k = 431 = (11010\underline{1}1111)_2$

$$T = ((P \cdot 2 + P) \cdot 2^2 + P) \cdot 2 = 26P$$

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$$T = ((P \cdot 2 + P) \cdot 2^2 + P) \cdot 2^2 = 52P$$

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- ▶ Example: $k = 431 = (110101\underline{111})_2$

$$T = (((P \cdot 2 + P) \cdot 2^2 + P) \cdot 2^2 + P) \cdot 2 = 106P$$

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- Example: $k = 431 = (110101\underline{1}11)_2$

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- ▶ Example: $k = 431 = (1101011\underline{11})_2$

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$$T = (((((P \cdot 2 + P) \cdot 2^2 + P) \cdot 2^2 + P) \cdot 2 + P) \cdot 2 + P) \cdot 2 + P = 215P$$

Double-and-add algorithm

- ▶ Denoting by $(k_{n-1} \dots k_1 k_0)_2$, with $n = \lceil \log_2 \ell \rceil$, the binary expansion of k :

function scalar-mult(k, P):

$T \leftarrow \mathcal{O}$

for $i \leftarrow n - 1$ **downto** 0:

$T \leftarrow 2T$

if $k_i = 1$:

$T \leftarrow T + P$

return T

- ▶ Example: $k = 431 = (110101111)_2$

$$T = ((((((P \cdot 2 + P) \cdot 2^2 + P) \cdot 2^2 + P) \cdot 2 + P) \cdot 2 + P) \cdot 2 + P) \cdot 2 = 430P$$

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return T

- ▶ Example: $k = 431 = (11010111\underline{1})_2$

$$T = ((((((P \cdot 2 + P) \cdot 2^2 + P) \cdot 2^2 + P) \cdot 2 + P) \cdot 2 + P) \cdot 2 + P) \cdot 2 + P) \cdot 2 + P = 431P$$

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Double-and-add algorithm

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```
function scalar-mult( $k, P$ ):  
     $T \leftarrow \mathcal{O}$   
    for  $i \leftarrow n - 1$  downto  $0$ :  
         $T \leftarrow 2T$   
        if  $k_i = 1$ :  
             $T \leftarrow T + P$   
    return  $T$ 
```

- Example: $k = 431 = (110101111)_2$

$$T = ((((((P \cdot 2 + P) \cdot 2^2 + P) \cdot 2^2 + P) \cdot 2 + P) \cdot 2 + P) \cdot 2 + P) \cdot 2 + P = 431P$$

- Complexity in $O(n) = O(\log_2 \ell)$ operations over $E(\mathbb{F}_q)$:
- n doublings, and
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Windowed method

- ▶ Consider 2^w -ary expansion of k : i.e., split k into w -bit chunks

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- ▶ Example with $w = 3$: $k = 431$

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 - $2^{w-1} - 1$ doublings, and
 - $2^{w-1} - 1$ additions
- ▶ Example with $w = 3$: $k = 431 = (110\ 101\ 111)_2$

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- ▶ Consider 2^w -ary expansion of k : i.e., split k into w -bit chunks
- ▶ Precompute $2P, 3P, \dots, (2^w - 1)P$:
 - $2^{w-1} - 1$ doublings, and
 - $2^{w-1} - 1$ additions
- ▶ Example with $w = 3$: $k = 431 = (110\ 101\ 111)_2 = (657)_{2^3}$

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$$T = \quad = \quad \mathcal{O}$$

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 - $2^{w-1} - 1$ additions
- ▶ Example with $w = 3$: $k = 431 = (\underline{110} 101 111)_2 = (\underline{657})_{2^3}$

$$T = 6P = 6P$$

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- ▶ Consider 2^w -ary expansion of k : i.e., split k into w -bit chunks
- ▶ Precompute $2P, 3P, \dots, (2^w - 1)P$:
 - $2^{w-1} - 1$ doublings, and
 - $2^{w-1} - 1$ additions
- ▶ Example with $w = 3$: $k = 431 = (110 \underline{101} 111)_2 = (\underline{657})_{2^3}$

$$T = 6P \cdot 2^3 = 48P$$

Windowed method

- ▶ Consider 2^w -ary expansion of k : i.e., split k into w -bit chunks
- ▶ Precompute $2P, 3P, \dots, (2^w - 1)P$:
 - $2^{w-1} - 1$ doublings, and
 - $2^{w-1} - 1$ additions
- ▶ Example with $w = 3$: $k = 431 = (110 \underline{101} 111)_2 = (6\underline{5}7)_{2^3}$

$$T = 6P \cdot 2^3 + 5P = 53P$$

Windowed method

- ▶ Consider 2^w -ary expansion of k : i.e., split k into w -bit chunks
- ▶ Precompute $2P, 3P, \dots, (2^w - 1)P$:
 - $2^{w-1} - 1$ doublings, and
 - $2^{w-1} - 1$ additions
- ▶ Example with $w = 3$: $k = 431 = (110\ 101\ \underline{111})_2 = (6\underline{57})_{2^3}$

$$T = (6P \cdot 2^3 + 5P) \cdot 2^3 = 424P$$

Windowed method

- ▶ Consider 2^w -ary expansion of k : i.e., split k into w -bit chunks
- ▶ Precompute $2P, 3P, \dots, (2^w - 1)P$:
 - $2^{w-1} - 1$ doublings, and
 - $2^{w-1} - 1$ additions
- ▶ Example with $w = 3$: $k = 431 = (110\ 101\ \underline{111})_2 = (65\underline{7})_{2^3}$

$$T = (6P \cdot 2^3 + 5P) \cdot 2^3 + 7P = 431P$$

Windowed method

- ▶ Consider 2^w -ary expansion of k : i.e., split k into w -bit chunks
- ▶ Precompute $2P, 3P, \dots, (2^w - 1)P$:
 - $2^{w-1} - 1$ doublings, and
 - $2^{w-1} - 1$ additions
- ▶ Example with $w = 3$: $k = 431 = (110\ 101\ 111)_2 = (657)_{2^3}$

$$T = (6P \cdot 2^3 + 5P) \cdot 2^3 + 7P = 431P$$

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- ▶ Precompute $2P, 3P, \dots, (2^w - 1)P$:
 - $2^{w-1} - 1$ doublings, and
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- ▶ Example with $w = 3$: $k = 431 = (110\ 101\ 111)_2 = (657)_{2^3}$

$$T = (6P \cdot 2^3 + 5P) \cdot 2^3 + 7P = 431P$$

- ▶ Complexity:
 - n doublings, and
 - $(1 - 2^{-w})n/w$ additions on average

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- ▶ Select w carefully so that **precomputation cost** does not become **predominant**

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- ▶ Precompute $2P, 3P, \dots, (2^w - 1)P$:
 - $2^{w-1} - 1$ doublings, and
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- ▶ Example with $w = 3$: $k = 431 = (110\ 101\ 111)_2 = (657)_{2^3}$

$$T = (6P \cdot 2^3 + 5P) \cdot 2^3 + 7P = 431P$$

- ▶ Complexity:
 - n doublings, and
 - $(1 - 2^{-w})n/w$ additions on average
- ▶ Select w carefully so that precomputation cost does not become predominant
- ▶ Sliding window variant: half as many precomputations

Non-adjacent form

- ▶ Fact: computing the opposite of a point on $E(\mathbb{F}_q)$ has a negligible cost

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- ▶ Example with $w = 3$ (digits in $\{\bar{3}, \bar{1}, 0, 1, 3\}$): $k = 431 = (3003000\bar{1})_2$

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- ▶ Example with $w = 3$ (digits in $\{\bar{3}, \bar{1}, 0, 1, 3\}$): $k = 431 = (3003000\bar{1})_2$

$$T = \quad = \quad \mathcal{O}$$

Non-adjacent form

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- ▶ Precompute $3P, 5P, \dots, (2^{w-1} - 1)P$:
 - 1 doubling, and
 - $2^{w-2} - 1$ additions
- ▶ Example with $w = 3$ (digits in $\{\bar{3}, \bar{1}, 0, 1, 3\}$): $k = 431 = (\underline{3}003000\bar{1})_2$

$$T = 3P \qquad = \quad 3P$$

Non-adjacent form

- ▶ Fact: computing the opposite of a point on $E(\mathbb{F}_q)$ has a negligible cost
- ▶ Idea: use signed digits to represent scalar k with minimal Hamming weight
- ▶ 2^w -ary non-adjacent form (w -NAF): use odd digits $\{-2^{w-1} + 1, \dots, 2^{w-1} - 1\}$ and 0 to represent k so that at most every w -th digit is non-zero
- ▶ Precompute $3P, 5P, \dots, (2^{w-1} - 1)P$:
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 - $2^{w-2} - 1$ additions
- ▶ Example with $w = 3$ (digits in $\{\bar{3}, \bar{1}, 0, 1, 3\}$): $k = 431 = (\underline{3}003000\bar{1})_2$

$$T = 3P \cdot 2 = 6P$$

Non-adjacent form

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- ▶ Precompute $3P, 5P, \dots, (2^{w-1} - 1)P$:
 - 1 doubling, and
 - $2^{w-2} - 1$ additions
- ▶ Example with $w = 3$ (digits in $\{\bar{3}, \bar{1}, 0, 1, 3\}$): $k = 431 = (3003000\bar{1})_2$

$$T = 3P \cdot 2^2 = 12P$$

Non-adjacent form

- ▶ Fact: computing the opposite of a point on $E(\mathbb{F}_q)$ has a negligible cost
- ▶ Idea: use signed digits to represent scalar k with minimal Hamming weight
- ▶ 2^w -ary non-adjacent form (w -NAF): use odd digits $\{-2^{w-1} + 1, \dots, 2^{w-1} - 1\}$ and 0 to represent k so that at most every w -th digit is non-zero
- ▶ Precompute $3P, 5P, \dots, (2^{w-1} - 1)P$:
 - 1 doubling, and
 - $2^{w-2} - 1$ additions
- ▶ Example with $w = 3$ (digits in $\{\bar{3}, \bar{1}, 0, 1, 3\}$): $k = 431 = (300\underline{3}000\bar{1})_2$

$$T = 3P \cdot 2^3 = 24P$$

Non-adjacent form

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- ▶ 2^w -ary non-adjacent form (w -NAF): use odd digits $\{-2^{w-1} + 1, \dots, 2^{w-1} - 1\}$ and 0 to represent k so that at most every w -th digit is non-zero
- ▶ Precompute $3P, 5P, \dots, (2^{w-1} - 1)P$:
 - 1 doubling, and
 - $2^{w-2} - 1$ additions
- ▶ Example with $w = 3$ (digits in $\{\bar{3}, \bar{1}, 0, 1, 3\}$): $k = 431 = (300\bar{3}000\bar{1})_2$

$$T = 3P \cdot 2^3 + 3P = 27P$$

Non-adjacent form

- ▶ Fact: computing the opposite of a point on $E(\mathbb{F}_q)$ has a negligible cost
- ▶ Idea: use signed digits to represent scalar k with minimal Hamming weight
- ▶ 2^w -ary non-adjacent form (w -NAF): use odd digits $\{-2^{w-1} + 1, \dots, 2^{w-1} - 1\}$ and 0 to represent k so that at most every w -th digit is non-zero
- ▶ Precompute $3P, 5P, \dots, (2^{w-1} - 1)P$:
 - 1 doubling, and
 - $2^{w-2} - 1$ additions
- ▶ Example with $w = 3$ (digits in $\{\bar{3}, \bar{1}, 0, 1, 3\}$): $k = 431 = (3003\underline{000}\bar{1})_2$

$$T = (3P \cdot 2^3 + 3P) \cdot 2 = 54P$$

Non-adjacent form

- ▶ Fact: computing the **opposite of a point** on $E(\mathbb{F}_q)$ has a **negligible cost**
- ▶ Idea: use **signed digits** to represent **scalar k** with minimal **Hamming weight**
- ▶ 2^w -ary non-adjacent form (w -NAF): use odd digits $\{-2^{w-1} + 1, \dots, 2^{w-1} - 1\}$ and 0 to represent k so that **at most every w -th digit is non-zero**
- ▶ Precompute $3P, 5P, \dots, (2^{w-1} - 1)P$:
 - 1 doubling, and
 - $2^{w-2} - 1$ additions
- ▶ Example with $w = 3$ (digits in $\{\bar{3}, \bar{1}, 0, 1, 3\}$): $k = 431 = (3003000\bar{1})_2$

$$T = (3P \cdot 2^3 + 3P) \cdot 2^2 = 108P$$

Non-adjacent form

- ▶ Fact: computing the **opposite of a point** on $E(\mathbb{F}_q)$ has a **negligible cost**
- ▶ Idea: use **signed digits** to represent **scalar k** with minimal **Hamming weight**
- ▶ 2^w -ary non-adjacent form (w -NAF): use odd digits $\{-2^{w-1} + 1, \dots, 2^{w-1} - 1\}$ and 0 to represent k so that **at most every w -th digit is non-zero**
- ▶ Precompute $3P, 5P, \dots, (2^{w-1} - 1)P$:
 - 1 doubling, and
 - $2^{w-2} - 1$ additions
- ▶ Example with $w = 3$ (digits in $\{\bar{3}, \bar{1}, 0, 1, 3\}$): $k = 431 = (3003000\underline{\bar{1}})_2$

$$T = (3P \cdot 2^3 + 3P) \cdot 2^3 = 216P$$

Non-adjacent form

- ▶ Fact: computing the opposite of a point on $E(\mathbb{F}_q)$ has a negligible cost
- ▶ Idea: use signed digits to represent scalar k with minimal Hamming weight
- ▶ 2^w -ary non-adjacent form (w -NAF): use odd digits $\{-2^{w-1} + 1, \dots, 2^{w-1} - 1\}$ and 0 to represent k so that at most every w -th digit is non-zero
- ▶ Precompute $3P, 5P, \dots, (2^{w-1} - 1)P$:
 - 1 doubling, and
 - $2^{w-2} - 1$ additions
- ▶ Example with $w = 3$ (digits in $\{\bar{3}, \bar{1}, 0, 1, 3\}$): $k = 431 = (3003000\bar{1})_2$

$$T = (3P \cdot 2^3 + 3P) \cdot 2^4 = 432P$$

Non-adjacent form

- ▶ Fact: computing the opposite of a point on $E(\mathbb{F}_q)$ has a negligible cost
- ▶ Idea: use signed digits to represent scalar k with minimal Hamming weight
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- ▶ Precompute $3P, 5P, \dots, (2^{w-1} - 1)P$:
 - 1 doubling, and
 - $2^{w-2} - 1$ additions
- ▶ Example with $w = 3$ (digits in $\{\bar{3}, \bar{1}, 0, 1, 3\}$): $k = 431 = (3003000\bar{1})_2$

$$T = (3P \cdot 2^3 + 3P) \cdot 2^4 - P = 431P$$

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- ▶ Example with $w = 3$ (digits in $\{\bar{3}, \bar{1}, 0, 1, 3\}$): $k = 431 = (3003000\bar{1})_2$

$$T = (3P \cdot 2^3 + 3P) \cdot 2^4 - P = 431P$$

- ▶ Complexity:
 - n doublings, and
 - $n/(w + 1)$ additions on average

Multi-exponentiation technique

- ▶ To compute the sum of several scalar multiplications

e.g., $aP + bQ$, where $a, b \in \mathbb{Z}/\ell\mathbb{Z}$ and $P, Q \in E(\mathbb{F}_q)$

Multi-exponentiation technique

- ▶ To compute the sum of several scalar multiplications

e.g., $aP + bQ$, where $a, b \in \mathbb{Z}/\ell\mathbb{Z}$ and $P, Q \in E(\mathbb{F}_q)$

- ▶ Idea:

- compute and accumulate all scalar multiplications simultaneously
- share doubling steps between multiplications

function double-scalar-mult(a, P, b, Q):

$S \leftarrow P + Q$

$T \leftarrow \mathcal{O}$

for $i \leftarrow n - 1$ **downto** 0:

$T \leftarrow 2T$

if $a_i = 1$ **and** $b_i = 1$:

$T \leftarrow T + S$

else if $a_i = 1$:

$T \leftarrow T + P$

else if $b_i = 1$:

$T \leftarrow T + Q$

return T

Multi-exponentiation technique

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$T \leftarrow T + S$

else if $a_i = 1$:

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else if $b_i = 1$:

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return T

- ▶ Example: $a = 21$
and $b = 30$

Multi-exponentiation technique

function double-scalar-mult(a, P, b, Q):

$S \leftarrow P + Q$

$T \leftarrow \mathcal{O}$

for $i \leftarrow n - 1$ **downto** 0:

$T \leftarrow 2T$

if $a_i = 1$ **and** $b_i = 1$:

$T \leftarrow T + S$

else if $a_i = 1$:

$T \leftarrow T + P$

else if $b_i = 1$:

$T \leftarrow T + Q$

return T

- Example: $a = 21 = (10101)_2$
and $b = 30 = (11110)_2$

Multi-exponentiation technique

function double-scalar-mult(a, P, b, Q):

$S \leftarrow P + Q$

$T \leftarrow \mathcal{O}$

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$T \leftarrow T + S$

else if $a_i = 1$:

$T \leftarrow T + P$

else if $b_i = 1$:

$T \leftarrow T + Q$

return T

- Example: $a = 21 = (10101)_2$
and $b = 30 = (11110)_2$

$T =$

$=$

\mathcal{O}

Multi-exponentiation technique

function double-scalar-mult(a, P, b, Q):

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else if $a_i = 1$:

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else if $b_i = 1$:

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return T

- Example: $a = 21 = (\underline{1}0101)_2$
and $b = 30 = (\underline{1}1110)_2$

$$T = P + Q = P + Q$$

Multi-exponentiation technique

function double-scalar-mult(a, P, b, Q):

$S \leftarrow P + Q$

$T \leftarrow \mathcal{O}$

for $i \leftarrow n - 1$ **downto** 0:

$T \leftarrow 2T$

if $a_i = 1$ **and** $b_i = 1$:

$T \leftarrow T + S$

else if $a_i = 1$:

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- Example: $a = 21 = (10101)_2$
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$$T = (P + Q) \cdot 2 = 2P + 2Q$$

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- Example: $a = 21 = (10101)_2$
and $b = 30 = (11110)_2$

$$T = (P + Q) \cdot 2 + Q = 2P + 3Q$$

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- Example: $a = 21 = (10\underline{1}01)_2$
and $b = 30 = (11\underline{1}10)_2$

$$T = ((P + Q) \cdot 2 + Q) \cdot 2 = 4P + 6Q$$

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$$T = ((P + Q) \cdot 2 + Q) \cdot 2 + P + Q = 5P + 7Q$$

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- Example: $a = 21 = (101\underline{01})_2$
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$$T = (((P + Q) \cdot 2 + Q) \cdot 2 + P + Q) \cdot 2 = 10P + 14Q$$

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- n doublings, and
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- ▶ Complexity:
 - n doublings, and
 - $3n/4$ additions on average
- ▶ With signed digits:
 - joint sparse form (JSF): $n/2$ additions
 - interleaved w -NAF: $2n/(w + 1)$ additions

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 - then $\psi : (x, y) \mapsto (-x, \xi y)$ is an endomorphism of E and, since

$$\psi^2(x, y) = (x, -y) = -(x, y),$$

its characteristic polynomial is $\chi_\psi(T) = T^2 + 1$ and $\lambda = \pm\sqrt{-1} \bmod \ell$

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► Popular constructions exploiting endomorphism ring:

- GLS curves (Galbraith, Lin, and Scott, 2008): large class of GLV-compatible curves
- Koblitz curves: binary curves, with Frobenius map $\psi : (x, y) \mapsto (x^2, y^2)$

Security issues

- ▶ Back to the double-and-add algorithm:

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function scalar-mult( $k, P$ ):  
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
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             $T \leftarrow T + P$   
    return  $T$ 
```

- ▶ At step i , point addition $T \leftarrow T + P$ is computed if and only if $k_i = 1$
 - careful timing analysis will reveal Hamming weight of secret k
 - power analysis will leak bits of k




Security issues

- ▶ Back to the double-and-add algorithm:

```
function scalar-mult( $k, P$ ):  
     $T \leftarrow \mathcal{O}$   
    for  $i \leftarrow n - 1$  downto 0:  
         $T \leftarrow 2T$   
        if  $k_i = 1$ :  
             $T \leftarrow T + P$   
    return  $T$ 
```

- ▶ At step i , point addition $T \leftarrow T + P$ is computed if and only if $k_i = 1$
 - careful timing analysis will reveal Hamming weight of secret k
 - power analysis will leak bits of k




Security issues

- ▶ Back to the double-and-add algorithm:

```
function scalar-mult( $k, P$ ):  
     $T \leftarrow \mathcal{O}$   
    for  $i \leftarrow n - 1$  downto 0:  
         $T \leftarrow 2T$   
        if  $k_i = 1$ :  
             $T \leftarrow T + P$   
        else:  
             $Z \leftarrow T + P$   
    return  $T$ 
```

- ▶ At step i , point addition $T \leftarrow T + P$ is computed if and only if $k_i = 1$
 - careful timing analysis will reveal Hamming weight of secret k
 - power analysis will leak bits of k




- ▶ Use double-and-add-always algorithm?

Security issues

- ▶ Back to the **double-and-add** algorithm:

```
function scalar-mult( $k, P$ ):  
     $T \leftarrow \mathcal{O}$   
    for  $i \leftarrow n - 1$  downto 0:  
         $T \leftarrow 2T$   
        if  $k_i = 1$ :  
             $T \leftarrow T + P$   
        else:  
             $Z \leftarrow T + P$   
    return  $T$ 
```

- ▶ At step i , point addition $T \leftarrow T + P$ is computed if and only if $k_i = 1$
 - careful **timing analysis** will reveal **Hamming weight** of secret k
 - **power analysis** will leak bits of k




- ▶ Use **double-and-add-always** algorithm?
 - the **result** of the point addition is used if and only if $k_i = 1$

Security issues

- ▶ Back to the double-and-add algorithm:

```
function scalar-mult( $k, P$ ):  
     $T \leftarrow \mathcal{O}$   
    for  $i \leftarrow n - 1$  downto 0:  
         $T \leftarrow 2T$   
        if  $k_i = 1$ :  
             $T \leftarrow T + P$   
        else:  
             $Z \leftarrow T + P$   
    return  $T$ 
```

- ▶ At step i , point addition $T \leftarrow T + P$ is computed if and only if $k_i = 1$
 - careful timing analysis will reveal Hamming weight of secret k
 - power analysis will leak bits of k



- ▶ Use double-and-add-always algorithm?
 - the result of the point addition is used if and only if $k_i = 1$ \Rightarrow vulnerable to fault attacks

The Montgomery ladder

- ▶ Algorithm proposed by [Montgomery](#) in 1987:

function scalar-mult(k, P):

$T_0 \leftarrow \mathcal{O}$

$T_1 \leftarrow P$

for $i \leftarrow n - 1$ **downto** 0:

if $k_i = 1$:

$T_0 \leftarrow T_0 + T_1$

$T_1 \leftarrow 2T_1$

else:

$T_1 \leftarrow T_0 + T_1$

$T_0 \leftarrow 2T_0$

return T_0

The Montgomery ladder

- ▶ Algorithm proposed by [Montgomery](#) in 1987:

function scalar-mult(k, P):

$T_0 \leftarrow \mathcal{O}$

$T_1 \leftarrow P$

for $i \leftarrow n - 1$ **downto** 0:

if $k_i = 1$:

$T_0 \leftarrow T_0 + T_1$

$T_1 \leftarrow 2T_1$

else:

$T_1 \leftarrow T_0 + T_1$

$T_0 \leftarrow 2T_0$

return T_0

- ▶ Properties:

The Montgomery ladder

- ▶ Algorithm proposed by [Montgomery](#) in 1987:

```
function scalar-mult( $k, P$ ):  
     $T_0 \leftarrow \mathcal{O}$   
     $T_1 \leftarrow P$   
    for  $i \leftarrow n - 1$  downto 0:  
        if  $k_i = 1$ :  
             $T_0 \leftarrow T_0 + T_1$   
             $T_1 \leftarrow 2T_1$   
        else:  
             $T_1 \leftarrow T_0 + T_1$   
             $T_0 \leftarrow 2T_0$   
    return  $T_0$ 
```

- ▶ Properties:
 - perform [one addition](#) and [one doubling](#) at each step

The Montgomery ladder

- ▶ Algorithm proposed by [Montgomery](#) in 1987:

```
function scalar-mult( $k, P$ ):  
   $T_0 \leftarrow \mathcal{O}$   
   $T_1 \leftarrow P$   
  for  $i \leftarrow n - 1$  downto 0:  
    if  $k_i = 1$ :  
       $T_0 \leftarrow T_0 + T_1$   
       $T_1 \leftarrow 2T_1$   
    else:  
       $T_1 \leftarrow T_0 + T_1$   
       $T_0 \leftarrow 2T_0$   
  return  $T_0$ 
```

- ▶ Properties:
 - perform [one addition](#) and [one doubling](#) at each step
 - ensure that [both results are used](#) in the next step

The Montgomery ladder

- ▶ Algorithm proposed by [Montgomery](#) in 1987:

```
function scalar-mult( $k, P$ ):  
   $T_0 \leftarrow \mathcal{O}$   
   $T_1 \leftarrow P$   
  for  $i \leftarrow n - 1$  downto 0:  
    if  $k_i = 1$ :  
       $T_0 \leftarrow T_0 + T_1$   
       $T_1 \leftarrow 2T_1$   
    else:  
       $T_1 \leftarrow T_0 + T_1$   
       $T_0 \leftarrow 2T_0$   
  return  $T_0$ 
```

- ▶ Properties:
 - perform [one addition](#) and [one doubling](#) at each step
 - ensure that [both results are used](#) in the next step
 - loop invariant: $T_1 = T_0 + P$

The Montgomery ladder

- ▶ Algorithm proposed by [Montgomery](#) in 1987:

```
function scalar-mult( $k, P$ ):  
     $T_0 \leftarrow \mathcal{O}$   
     $T_1 \leftarrow P$   
    for  $i \leftarrow n - 1$  downto 0:  
        if  $k_i = 1$ :  
             $T_0 \leftarrow T_0 + T_1$   
             $T_1 \leftarrow 2T_1$   
        else:  
             $T_1 \leftarrow T_0 + T_1$   
             $T_0 \leftarrow 2T_0$   
    return  $T_0$ 
```

- ▶ Properties:
 - perform [one addition](#) and [one doubling](#) at each step
 - ensure that [both results are used](#) in the next step
 - loop invariant: $T_1 = T_0 + P$
- ▶ Example: $k = 19$

The Montgomery ladder

- ▶ Algorithm proposed by [Montgomery](#) in 1987:

```
function scalar-mult( $k, P$ ):  
     $T_0 \leftarrow \mathcal{O}$   
     $T_1 \leftarrow P$   
    for  $i \leftarrow n - 1$  downto 0:  
        if  $k_i = 1$ :  
             $T_0 \leftarrow T_0 + T_1$   
             $T_1 \leftarrow 2T_1$   
        else:  
             $T_1 \leftarrow T_0 + T_1$   
             $T_0 \leftarrow 2T_0$   
    return  $T_0$ 
```

- ▶ Properties:
 - perform [one addition](#) and [one doubling](#) at each step
 - ensure that [both results are used](#) in the next step
 - loop invariant: $T_1 = T_0 + P$
- ▶ Example: $k = 19 = (10011)_2$

The Montgomery ladder

- ▶ Algorithm proposed by [Montgomery](#) in 1987:

```
function scalar-mult( $k, P$ ):  
     $T_0 \leftarrow \mathcal{O}$   
     $T_1 \leftarrow P$   
    for  $i \leftarrow n - 1$  downto 0:  
        if  $k_i = 1$ :  
             $T_0 \leftarrow T_0 + T_1$   
             $T_1 \leftarrow 2T_1$   
        else:  
             $T_1 \leftarrow T_0 + T_1$   
             $T_0 \leftarrow 2T_0$   
    return  $T_0$ 
```

- ▶ Properties:
 - perform [one addition](#) and [one doubling](#) at each step
 - ensure that [both results are used](#) in the next step
 - loop invariant: $T_1 = T_0 + P$
- ▶ Example: $k = 19 = (10011)_2$

$$\begin{aligned} T_0 &= & &= \mathcal{O} \\ T_1 &= P & &= P \end{aligned}$$

The Montgomery ladder

- ▶ Algorithm proposed by [Montgomery](#) in 1987:

```
function scalar-mult( $k, P$ ):  
     $T_0 \leftarrow \mathcal{O}$   
     $T_1 \leftarrow P$   
    for  $i \leftarrow n - 1$  downto 0:  
        if  $k_i = 1$ :  
             $T_0 \leftarrow T_0 + T_1$   
             $T_1 \leftarrow 2T_1$   
        else:  
             $T_1 \leftarrow T_0 + T_1$   
             $T_0 \leftarrow 2T_0$   
    return  $T_0$ 
```

- ▶ Properties:
 - perform [one addition](#) and [one doubling](#) at each step
 - ensure that [both results are used](#) in the next step
 - loop invariant: $T_1 = T_0 + P$
- ▶ Example: $k = 19 = (\underline{1}0011)_2$

$$\begin{array}{lcl} T_0 & = & \mathcal{O} \\ T_1 & = & P \end{array}$$

The Montgomery ladder

- ▶ Algorithm proposed by [Montgomery](#) in 1987:

```
function scalar-mult( $k, P$ ):  
     $T_0 \leftarrow \mathcal{O}$   
     $T_1 \leftarrow P$   
    for  $i \leftarrow n - 1$  downto 0:  
        if  $k_i = 1$ :  
             $T_0 \leftarrow T_0 + T_1$   
             $T_1 \leftarrow 2T_1$   
        else:  
             $T_1 \leftarrow T_0 + T_1$   
             $T_0 \leftarrow 2T_0$   
    return  $T_0$ 
```

- ▶ Properties:
 - perform [one addition](#) and [one doubling](#) at each step
 - ensure that [both results are used](#) in the next step
 - loop invariant: $T_1 = T_0 + P$
- ▶ Example: $k = 19 = (\underline{1}0011)_2$

$$\begin{aligned} T_0 &= P & &= P \\ T_1 &= P & &= P \end{aligned}$$

The Montgomery ladder

- ▶ Algorithm proposed by [Montgomery](#) in 1987:

```
function scalar-mult( $k, P$ ):  
     $T_0 \leftarrow \mathcal{O}$   
     $T_1 \leftarrow P$   
    for  $i \leftarrow n - 1$  downto 0:  
        if  $k_i = 1$ :  
             $T_0 \leftarrow T_0 + T_1$   
             $T_1 \leftarrow 2T_1$   
        else:  
             $T_1 \leftarrow T_0 + T_1$   
             $T_0 \leftarrow 2T_0$   
    return  $T_0$ 
```

- ▶ Properties:
 - perform [one addition](#) and [one doubling](#) at each step
 - ensure that [both results are used](#) in the next step
 - loop invariant: $T_1 = T_0 + P$
- ▶ Example: $k = 19 = (\underline{1}0011)_2$

$$\begin{aligned} T_0 &= P & &= P \\ T_1 &= P \cdot 2 & &= 2P \end{aligned}$$

The Montgomery ladder

- ▶ Algorithm proposed by [Montgomery](#) in 1987:

```
function scalar-mult( $k, P$ ):  
   $T_0 \leftarrow \mathcal{O}$   
   $T_1 \leftarrow P$   
  for  $i \leftarrow n - 1$  downto 0:  
    if  $k_i = 1$ :  
       $T_0 \leftarrow T_0 + T_1$   
       $T_1 \leftarrow 2T_1$   
    else:  
       $T_1 \leftarrow T_0 + T_1$   
       $T_0 \leftarrow 2T_0$   
  return  $T_0$ 
```

- ▶ Properties:
 - perform [one addition](#) and [one doubling](#) at each step
 - ensure that [both results are used](#) in the next step
 - loop invariant: $T_1 = T_0 + P$
- ▶ Example: $k = 19 = (1\underline{0}011)_2$

$$\begin{aligned} T_0 &= P & &= P \\ T_1 &= P \cdot 2 & &= 2P \end{aligned}$$

The Montgomery ladder

- ▶ Algorithm proposed by [Montgomery](#) in 1987:

```
function scalar-mult( $k, P$ ):  
   $T_0 \leftarrow \mathcal{O}$   
   $T_1 \leftarrow P$   
  for  $i \leftarrow n - 1$  downto 0:  
    if  $k_i = 1$ :  
       $T_0 \leftarrow T_0 + T_1$   
       $T_1 \leftarrow 2T_1$   
    else:  
       $T_1 \leftarrow T_0 + T_1$   
       $T_0 \leftarrow 2T_0$   
  return  $T_0$ 
```

- ▶ Properties:
 - perform [one addition](#) and [one doubling](#) at each step
 - ensure that [both results are used](#) in the next step
 - loop invariant: $T_1 = T_0 + P$
- ▶ Example: $k = 19 = (1\underline{0}011)_2$

$$\begin{aligned} T_0 &= P & &= P \\ T_1 &= P \cdot 2 + P & &= 3P \end{aligned}$$

The Montgomery ladder

- ▶ Algorithm proposed by [Montgomery](#) in 1987:

```
function scalar-mult( $k, P$ ):  
   $T_0 \leftarrow \mathcal{O}$   
   $T_1 \leftarrow P$   
  for  $i \leftarrow n - 1$  downto 0:  
    if  $k_i = 1$ :  
       $T_0 \leftarrow T_0 + T_1$   
       $T_1 \leftarrow 2T_1$   
    else:  
       $T_1 \leftarrow T_0 + T_1$   
       $T_0 \leftarrow 2T_0$   
  return  $T_0$ 
```

- ▶ Properties:
 - perform [one addition](#) and [one doubling](#) at each step
 - ensure that [both results are used](#) in the next step
 - loop invariant: $T_1 = T_0 + P$
- ▶ Example: $k = 19 = (1\underline{0}011)_2$

$$\begin{aligned} T_0 &= P \cdot 2 &= 2P \\ T_1 &= P \cdot 2 + P &= 3P \end{aligned}$$

The Montgomery ladder

- ▶ Algorithm proposed by [Montgomery](#) in 1987:

```
function scalar-mult( $k, P$ ):  
     $T_0 \leftarrow \mathcal{O}$   
     $T_1 \leftarrow P$   
    for  $i \leftarrow n - 1$  downto 0:  
        if  $k_i = 1$ :  
             $T_0 \leftarrow T_0 + T_1$   
             $T_1 \leftarrow 2T_1$   
        else:  
             $T_1 \leftarrow T_0 + T_1$   
             $T_0 \leftarrow 2T_0$   
    return  $T_0$ 
```

- ▶ Properties:
 - perform [one addition](#) and [one doubling](#) at each step
 - ensure that [both results are used](#) in the next step
 - loop invariant: $T_1 = T_0 + P$
- ▶ Example: $k = 19 = (10\underline{0}11)_2$

$$T_0 = P \cdot 2 = 2P$$

$$T_1 = P \cdot 2 + P = 3P$$

The Montgomery ladder

- ▶ Algorithm proposed by [Montgomery](#) in 1987:

```
function scalar-mult( $k, P$ ):  
   $T_0 \leftarrow \mathcal{O}$   
   $T_1 \leftarrow P$   
  for  $i \leftarrow n - 1$  downto 0:  
    if  $k_i = 1$ :  
       $T_0 \leftarrow T_0 + T_1$   
       $T_1 \leftarrow 2T_1$   
    else:  
       $T_1 \leftarrow T_0 + T_1$   
       $T_0 \leftarrow 2T_0$   
  return  $T_0$ 
```

- ▶ Properties:
 - perform [one addition](#) and [one doubling](#) at each step
 - ensure that [both results are used](#) in the next step
 - loop invariant: $T_1 = T_0 + P$
- ▶ Example: $k = 19 = (10\underline{0}11)_2$

$$T_0 = P \cdot 2 = 2P$$

$$T_1 = P \cdot 2 + P + 2P = 5P$$

The Montgomery ladder

- ▶ Algorithm proposed by [Montgomery](#) in 1987:

```
function scalar-mult( $k, P$ ):  
   $T_0 \leftarrow \mathcal{O}$   
   $T_1 \leftarrow P$   
  for  $i \leftarrow n - 1$  downto 0:  
    if  $k_i = 1$ :  
       $T_0 \leftarrow T_0 + T_1$   
       $T_1 \leftarrow 2T_1$   
    else:  
       $T_1 \leftarrow T_0 + T_1$   
       $T_0 \leftarrow 2T_0$   
  return  $T_0$ 
```

- ▶ Properties:
 - perform [one addition](#) and [one doubling](#) at each step
 - ensure that [both results are used](#) in the next step
 - loop invariant: $T_1 = T_0 + P$
- ▶ Example: $k = 19 = (10\underline{0}11)_2$

$$\begin{aligned} T_0 &= P \cdot 2^2 &= 4P \\ T_1 &= P \cdot 2 + P + 2P &= 5P \end{aligned}$$

The Montgomery ladder

- ▶ Algorithm proposed by [Montgomery](#) in 1987:

```
function scalar-mult( $k, P$ ):  
   $T_0 \leftarrow \mathcal{O}$   
   $T_1 \leftarrow P$   
  for  $i \leftarrow n - 1$  downto 0:  
    if  $k_i = 1$ :  
       $T_0 \leftarrow T_0 + T_1$   
       $T_1 \leftarrow 2T_1$   
    else:  
       $T_1 \leftarrow T_0 + T_1$   
       $T_0 \leftarrow 2T_0$   
  return  $T_0$ 
```

- ▶ Properties:
 - perform [one addition](#) and [one doubling](#) at each step
 - ensure that [both results are used](#) in the next step
 - loop invariant: $T_1 = T_0 + P$
- ▶ Example: $k = 19 = (100\underline{1}1)_2$

$$T_0 = P \cdot 2^2 = 4P$$

$$T_1 = P \cdot 2 + P + 2P = 5P$$

The Montgomery ladder

- ▶ Algorithm proposed by [Montgomery](#) in 1987:

```
function scalar-mult( $k, P$ ):  
     $T_0 \leftarrow \mathcal{O}$   
     $T_1 \leftarrow P$   
    for  $i \leftarrow n - 1$  downto 0:  
        if  $k_i = 1$ :  
             $T_0 \leftarrow T_0 + T_1$   
             $T_1 \leftarrow 2T_1$   
        else:  
             $T_1 \leftarrow T_0 + T_1$   
             $T_0 \leftarrow 2T_0$   
    return  $T_0$ 
```

- ▶ Properties:
 - perform [one addition](#) and [one doubling](#) at each step
 - ensure that [both results are used](#) in the next step
 - loop invariant: $T_1 = T_0 + P$
- ▶ Example: $k = 19 = (100\underline{1}1)_2$

$$T_0 = P \cdot 2^2 + 5P = 9P$$

$$T_1 = P \cdot 2 + P + 2P = 5P$$

The Montgomery ladder

- ▶ Algorithm proposed by [Montgomery](#) in 1987:

```
function scalar-mult( $k, P$ ):  
   $T_0 \leftarrow \mathcal{O}$   
   $T_1 \leftarrow P$   
  for  $i \leftarrow n - 1$  downto 0:  
    if  $k_i = 1$ :  
       $T_0 \leftarrow T_0 + T_1$   
       $T_1 \leftarrow 2T_1$   
    else:  
       $T_1 \leftarrow T_0 + T_1$   
       $T_0 \leftarrow 2T_0$   
  return  $T_0$ 
```

- ▶ Properties:
 - perform [one addition](#) and [one doubling](#) at each step
 - ensure that [both results are used](#) in the next step
 - loop invariant: $T_1 = T_0 + P$
- ▶ Example: $k = 19 = (100\underline{1}1)_2$

$$T_0 = P \cdot 2^2 + 5P = 9P$$

$$T_1 = (P \cdot 2 + P + 2P) \cdot 2 = 10P$$

The Montgomery ladder

- ▶ Algorithm proposed by [Montgomery](#) in 1987:

```
function scalar-mult( $k, P$ ):  
   $T_0 \leftarrow \mathcal{O}$   
   $T_1 \leftarrow P$   
  for  $i \leftarrow n - 1$  downto 0:  
    if  $k_i = 1$ :  
       $T_0 \leftarrow T_0 + T_1$   
       $T_1 \leftarrow 2T_1$   
    else:  
       $T_1 \leftarrow T_0 + T_1$   
       $T_0 \leftarrow 2T_0$   
  return  $T_0$ 
```

- ▶ Properties:
 - perform [one addition](#) and [one doubling](#) at each step
 - ensure that [both results are used](#) in the next step
 - loop invariant: $T_1 = T_0 + P$
- ▶ Example: $k = 19 = (1001\underline{1})_2$

$$T_0 = P \cdot 2^2 + 5P = 9P$$

$$T_1 = (P \cdot 2 + P + 2P) \cdot 2 = 10P$$

The Montgomery ladder

- ▶ Algorithm proposed by [Montgomery](#) in 1987:

```
function scalar-mult( $k, P$ ):  
   $T_0 \leftarrow \mathcal{O}$   
   $T_1 \leftarrow P$   
  for  $i \leftarrow n - 1$  downto 0:  
    if  $k_i = 1$ :  
       $T_0 \leftarrow T_0 + T_1$   
       $T_1 \leftarrow 2T_1$   
    else:  
       $T_1 \leftarrow T_0 + T_1$   
       $T_0 \leftarrow 2T_0$   
  return  $T_0$ 
```

- ▶ Properties:
 - perform [one addition](#) and [one doubling](#) at each step
 - ensure that [both results are used](#) in the next step
 - loop invariant: $T_1 = T_0 + P$
- ▶ Example: $k = 19 = (1001\underline{1})_2$

$$T_0 = P \cdot 2^2 + 5P + 10P = 19P$$

$$T_1 = (P \cdot 2 + P + 2P) \cdot 2 = 10P$$

The Montgomery ladder

- ▶ Algorithm proposed by [Montgomery](#) in 1987:

```
function scalar-mult( $k, P$ ):  
   $T_0 \leftarrow \mathcal{O}$   
   $T_1 \leftarrow P$   
  for  $i \leftarrow n - 1$  downto 0:  
    if  $k_i = 1$ :  
       $T_0 \leftarrow T_0 + T_1$   
       $T_1 \leftarrow 2T_1$   
    else:  
       $T_1 \leftarrow T_0 + T_1$   
       $T_0 \leftarrow 2T_0$   
  return  $T_0$ 
```

- ▶ Properties:
 - perform [one addition](#) and [one doubling](#) at each step
 - ensure that [both results are used](#) in the next step
 - loop invariant: $T_1 = T_0 + P$
- ▶ Example: $k = 19 = (1001\underline{1})_2$

$$T_0 = P \cdot 2^2 + 5P + 10P = 19P$$

$$T_1 = (P \cdot 2 + P + 2P) \cdot 2^2 = 20P$$

The Montgomery ladder

- ▶ Algorithm proposed by [Montgomery](#) in 1987:

```
function scalar-mult( $k, P$ ):  
     $T_0 \leftarrow \mathcal{O}$   
     $T_1 \leftarrow P$   
    for  $i \leftarrow n - 1$  downto 0:  
        if  $k_i = 1$ :  
             $T_0 \leftarrow T_0 + T_1$   
             $T_1 \leftarrow 2T_1$   
        else:  
             $T_1 \leftarrow T_0 + T_1$   
             $T_0 \leftarrow 2T_0$   
    return  $T_0$ 
```

- ▶ Properties:
 - perform [one addition](#) and [one doubling](#) at each step
 - ensure that [both results are used](#) in the next step
 - loop invariant: $T_1 = T_0 + P$
- ▶ Example: $k = 19 = (10011)_2$

$$T_0 = P \cdot 2^2 + 5P + 10P = 19P$$

$$T_1 = (P \cdot 2 + P + 2P) \cdot 2^2 = 20P$$

More security issues

```
function scalar-mult( $k, P$ ):  
   $T_0 \leftarrow \mathcal{O}$   
   $T_1 \leftarrow P$   
  for  $i \leftarrow n - 1$  downto 0:  
    if  $k_i = 1$ :  
       $T_0 \leftarrow T_0 + T_1$   
       $T_1 \leftarrow 2T_1$   
    else:  
       $T_1 \leftarrow T_0 + T_1$   
       $T_0 \leftarrow 2T_0$   
  return  $T_0$ 
```

More security issues

```
function scalar-mult( $k, P$ ):  
   $T_0 \leftarrow \mathcal{O}$   
   $T_1 \leftarrow P$   
  for  $i \leftarrow n - 1$  downto 0:  
    if  $k_i = 1$ :  
       $T_0 \leftarrow T_0 + T_1$   
       $T_1 \leftarrow 2T_1$   
    else:  
       $T_1 \leftarrow T_0 + T_1$   
       $T_0 \leftarrow 2T_0$   
  return  $T_0$ 
```

- ▶ The conditional branches depend on the value of secret bit k_i

More security issues

```
function scalar-mult( $k, P$ ):  
     $T_0 \leftarrow \mathcal{O}$   
     $T_1 \leftarrow P$   
    for  $i \leftarrow n - 1$  downto 0:  
        if  $k_i = 1$ :  
             $T_0 \leftarrow T_0 + T_1$   
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$R \leftarrow T_0 + T_1$

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
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
Outline

- I. Scalar multiplication
- II. Elliptic curve arithmetic**
- III. Finite field arithmetic
- IV. Software considerations
- V. Notions of hardware design


Addition and doubling




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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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- ▶ Explicit-Formula Database (by Bernstein and Lange):

<http://hyperelliptic.org/EFD/>

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\Rightarrow **x -only doubling**

- ▶ We can **drop the y -coordinate** altogether in the **scalar multiplication**
 - use **projective coordinates**: points $(X : Z)$ with $x = X/Z$
 - **cheap differential addition** ($4M + 2S$) and **doubling** ($2M + 2S$)

Montgomery curves

- ▶ Proposed by **Montgomery** in 1987, **Montgomery curves** are of the form

$$C/\mathbb{F}_q : By^2 = x^3 + Ax^2 + x, \text{ with parameters } A, B \in \mathbb{F}_q \text{ and } \text{char}(\mathbb{F}_q) \neq 2$$

- all **Montgomery curves** are **elliptic curves**
 - not all **elliptic curves** can be rewritten in **Montgomery form**
- ▶ Addition and doubling formulae
 - let $P = (x_P, y_P)$ and $Q = (x_Q, y_Q) \in C(\mathbb{F}_q) \setminus \{\mathcal{O}\}$, with $P \neq \pm Q$
 - then, writing $R = P + Q = (x_R, y_R)$ and $S = P - Q = (x_S, y_S)$, we have

$$x_R x_S (x_P - x_Q)^2 = (x_P x_Q - 1)^2$$

- the x -coord. of $R = P + Q$ depends only on the x -coord. of P , Q , and $P - Q$
 \Rightarrow **x -only differential addition**
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
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 - compatible with the **Montgomery ladder** (since $T_1 - T_0 = P$)

Edwards curves

- ▶ Proposed by [Edwards](#) in 2007, [Edwards curves](#) are of the form

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


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- ▶ Generalization by Bernstein *et al.* (2008): twisted Edwards curves
$$C/\mathbb{F}_q : ax^2 + y^2 = 1 + dx^2y^2$$
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 - birationally equivalent to Montgomery curves

Outline

- I. Scalar multiplication
- II. Elliptic curve arithmetic
- III. Finite field arithmetic**
- IV. Software considerations
- V. Notions of hardware design

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
⇒ elements of \mathbb{F}_q represented using several words

Multiprecision representation

- ▶ Consider $A \in \mathbb{F}_P$, with P an n -bit prime

Multiprecision representation


- ▶ Consider $A \in \mathbb{F}_P$, with P an n -bit prime
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
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


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


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


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


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


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


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


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


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


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


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


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


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MP multiplication

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$$\begin{array}{r} \begin{array}{|c|c|c|c|} \hline a_3 & a_2 & a_1 & a_0 \\ \hline \end{array} \\ \times \begin{array}{|c|c|c|c|} \hline b_3 & b_2 & b_1 & b_0 \\ \hline \end{array} \\ \hline \end{array}$$


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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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- ▶ Examples: $P = 2^{255} - 19$ (Curve25519) or $P = 2^{448} - 2^{224} - 1$ (Ed448-Goldilocks)



MP modular reduction: general case

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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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


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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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 - typically, the m_i 's are chosen to fit in a machine word (w bits)
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
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


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


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


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
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
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
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▶ Limitations:

- operations are computed in $\mathbb{Z}/M\mathbb{Z}$: beware of overflows!
- no simple way to compute divisions, modular reductions or comparisons



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$$q = \left\lfloor \sum_{i=1}^k \frac{|a_i \cdot M_i^{-1}|_{m_i} \cdot M_i}{M} \right\rfloor \approx \left\lfloor \sum_{i=1}^k \frac{|a_i \cdot M_i^{-1}|_{m_i}}{2^w} \right\rfloor$$

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RNS modular reduction

- ▶ Not a positional number system: no equivalent of pseudo-Mersenne primes in RNS
⇒ Need to approximate CRT reconstruction and reduce it modulo P

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function reduce-mod- $P(\vec{A})$:

$$(\forall i) z_i \leftarrow |a_i \cdot |M_i^{-1}|_{m_i}|_{m_i}$$

$$(\forall i) \tilde{z}_i \leftarrow \lfloor z_i / 2^{w-t} \rfloor$$

$$\tilde{q} \leftarrow \lfloor \sum_i \tilde{z}_i / 2^t + \varepsilon \rfloor$$

$$(\forall i) r_i \leftarrow 0$$

for $j \leftarrow 1$ **to** k :

$$(\forall i) r_i \leftarrow |r_i + z_j \cdot ||M_j|_P|_{m_i}|_{m_i}$$

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RNS modular reduction

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- for all $i \in \{1, \dots, k\}$, $|M_i^{-1}|_{m_i}$ (k words)

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► Cost:

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► Cost: k mults

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► Cost: k mults + k^2 mults

RNS modular reduction

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► Cost: k mults + k^2 mults \rightarrow quadratic complexity

RNS Montgomery reduction

- ▶ Requires two RNS bases $\mathcal{B}_\alpha = (m_{\alpha,1}, \dots, m_{\alpha,k})$ and $\mathcal{B}_\beta = (m_{\beta,1}, \dots, m_{\beta,k})$ such that $P < M_\alpha$, $P < M_\beta$, and $\gcd(M_\alpha, M_\beta) = 1$


RNS Montgomery reduction

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- ▶ RNS base extension algorithm (BE) [Kawamura *et al.*, 2000]
 - given \vec{X}_α in base \mathcal{B}_α , $\text{BE}(\vec{X}_\alpha, \mathcal{B}_\alpha, \mathcal{B}_\beta)$ computes \vec{X}_β , the repr. of X in base \mathcal{B}_β
 - similarly, $\text{BE}(\vec{X}_\beta, \mathcal{B}_\beta, \mathcal{B}_\alpha)$ computes \vec{X}_α in base \mathcal{B}_α


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 - similar to RNS modular reduction $\rightarrow O(k^2)$ complexity


RNS Montgomery reduction




RNS Montgomery reduction




RNS Montgomery reduction




RNS Montgomery reduction




RNS Montgomery reduction




RNS Montgomery reduction




RNS Montgomery reduction




RNS Montgomery reduction




RNS Montgomery reduction




RNS Montgomery reduction




RNS Montgomery reduction



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


RNS Montgomery reduction



► Result is $(\vec{R}_\alpha, \vec{R}_\beta) \equiv (A \cdot M_\alpha^{-1}) \pmod{P}$

RNS Montgomery reduction



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► See recent results on this topic by [Bigou and Tisserand](#)

Outline

- I. Scalar multiplication
- II. Elliptic curve arithmetic
- III. Finite field arithmetic
- IV. Software considerations**
- V. Notions of hardware design

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- ▶ HDL paradigm completely different from software programming languages
 - used to describe concurrent systems: unable to express sequentiality
 - structural and hierarchical description of the circuit

A half-adder in VHDL

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$$x + y = s + 2co$$

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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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A full-adder in VHDL

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
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
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
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
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▶ Implementation

- mapping: builds a netlist of technology-dependent logic cells / transistors
- place and route: place each logic cell on the chip and route wires between them

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- ▶ Polynomial representation: $\mathbb{F}_{2^m} \cong \mathbb{F}_2[x]/(F(x))$

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- use Fermat's little theorem: $A^{-1} = A^{2^m-2} = (A^{2^{m-1}-1})^2$
- computing $A^{2^{m-1}-1}$ only requires multiplications and Frobeniuses

[Itoh and Tsujii, 1988]


- no extra hardware for inversion

Multiplication over \mathbb{F}_{2^m}

- ▶ Low-area design: parallel–serial multiplier
 - iterative algorithm of quadratic complexity
 - d coefficients of the second operand processed at each iteration (most-significant coefficients first)


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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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


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 - $\lceil m/d \rceil$ clock cycles for computing the product
 - area grows with d : area–time trade-off




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
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- feedback loop for accumulation of the result




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- feedback loop for accumulation of the result
- coefficient-wise partial product with \mathbb{F}_2 multipliers (AND gates)




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
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
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- coefficient-wise addition (XOR gates in \mathbb{F}_2)




Arithmetic coprocessor for ECC over \mathbb{F}_{2^m}




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
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Thank you for your attention

Questions?